FRESHERS' PARTY - "KHUSHAMDEED"
South Asian Division
23 September 2006
Conference Room, CLG

PHOTOFEAST

Prof.Mahendra P Lama, Chair Person (above)

Prof. Partha Ghosh (above)

Prof. Mukherjee (above)

Audience

WORKSHOP ON FORCED MIGRATION

Photographs of some of our students at the workshop held at
Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi

DISCUSSION ON GLOBALIZATION
By Dr. Rajeev Kumar
Director, ICRIER, New Delhi
Committee Room 1, SIS Building
18 September 2006

DISCUSSION ON BALOCHISTAN

13 September 2006, Wednesday

Committee Room, SIS, JNU

(Report of the Panel Discussion held at the Committee Room on 13 September 2006. The panel comprised of Prof. Kalim Bahadur, Dr. D Suba Chandran and Cdr. Alok Bansal. Prof. Mukherjee Chaired the session)

The discussion focused on the developments in Balochistan after the killing of Akbar Khan Bugti, the leader of Bugti tribe. Linkages to past insurgencies in the region, demands of the Baloch Sardars, interests of Baloch sub tribes, involvement of a foreign hand and the role of the Pakistani army in Bugti's killing were some of the significant factors examined. Another crucial issue debated was whether Bugti's death has any space for external intervention in Balochistan.

Dr. Suba Chandran
Assistant Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

Bugti's killing has not yet become a political disaster. It was a military initiative with no involvement of the political elite. Musharraf has won the 'battle' but the 'war' against Baloch nationalism is far from over. Also, without external support, Baloch nationalist movement will not succeed.

Firstly, circumstances prevailing prior to Bugti's killing need to be closely examined. The sub tribes of the Bugtis namely Kalpars and Masuris have been traditional opponents of Akbar Bugti. The military regime purposely pushed the Kalpars back to Dera Bugti and Sui areas, while Musharraf tried to side with the Kalpars on their claim over Sui and the royalty accruing from it in order to weaken Akbar Bugti's position.

Moreover, there were series of surrenders by Marri and Bugti tribesmen and Musharraf ensured that no political vacuum prevailed before the killing of Bugti. Two days before the killing, a tribal jirga comprising of most of the sub tribes was held that decided to confiscate Bugti's property. The jirga agreed on the prevalence of Pakistani Law and abolition of the Sardari system.

Sui is highly important to Pakistan due to its rich gas reserves, royalty and supplies. Therefore, killing of Bugti aimed at teaching him a lesson for trying to gain more benefits from the area.

Secondly, the future of the Baloch nationalist movement is unclear. Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, and Nawab Khair Bux Marri had their own differences that resulted in numerous egoistic clashes. With the killing of Bugti, the question is who will represent him? There is an intra family clash among the Bugtis over the new Sardar's position. The alliance of the heads of three tribes against the centre is in trouble. However, another view is that by killing Bugti, Musharraf has made him a national 'hero.'

Thirdly, the Balochistan Liberation Army or BLA does not have the capability to fight a long waged war against the army or carry out guerilla warfare. It remains a Marri militia and the involvement of Bugtis and Mengals is limited. The role of the middle class and the Baloch Diaspora in the BLA has to be analyzed in greater depth. It is doubtful if the BLA will become a potent force to reckon with, given its inherent weakness and strength of Pakistan's 'lethal' armed forces.

So far, it is a military initiative and not a 'national disaster' and the opposition has not been able to mobilize or push for the no-confidence motion. Even the PML-Q has not split. The MMA will decide whether it wants to continue its membership in the Baloch Legislative Assembly. Thus, Bugti's killing has not become a rallying point for the political parties. Only some border districts of Sindh and Karachi have witnessed violence and protests while other districts are peaceful. The killing of Bugti is more a mistake than a disaster.

Many believe that US has vested interests in the region because of the Chinese presence and interest in Gwadar. It is important to bear in mind that neither the Baloch nationalist movement nor the Baloch armed movement will succeed until they get proactive external support.

Cdr.Alok Bansal
Research Fellow, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses

Sporadic cases of violence continue across the entire length and breadth of Balochistan. The Gwadar port, Mirani dam, and government buildings have been targeted besides communication links and gas pipelines that have been hit by the insurgents with alarming regularity. Security forces have raided some Baloch living in Karachi and Quetta and claimed to have recovered a large cache of arms from Marri camp in Quetta. Political attempts to negotiate have come to a nought, though the parliamentary committee on Balochistan has recommended a hefty economic package for the province but the nationalists are firm on their two demands namely, halting the construction of three new cantonments in Balochistan and handing over the Gwadar port and its development to the provincial government.

It would be misleading to consider the incidents at Dera Bugti and Sui as distinct from other events in Balochistan. The fighting against the security forces around Sui and Dera Bugti has been largely carried out by Bugti tribesmen, as is borne out by the control that was exercised by Nawab Bugti on the tribesmen. But the BLA’s involvement has also been clearly evident. In fact, an organization called Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) claimed responsibility for the firings on the Sui gas plant. Nawab Bugti has claimed that BLA, BLF and BPLF are different organisations, but they appear to be one and the same organisation or at best three closely allied organisations. Their men are suspected to be manning the positions on the hills surrounding the region. It is likely that the firing of Russian made rockets and mortars has been coordinated by these three groups. Nawab

Bugti as well as Nawab Khair Bux Marri and Sardar Ataullah Mengal have not hidden their sympathies and support for the BLA. Their articulations of Baloch demands and negotiations indicate that they have influence with the BLA, but they may not control this organisation. “This is why anti-Islamabad Baloch leaders are not prepared to take responsibility for the actions of BLA even as they secretly urge it to wage war against the external ‘occupying’ power.”

If the violence in Balochistan intensifies, the Pakistani army will definitely be sucked into a war that will fester and bleed Pakistan. According to a well-known Pakistani journalist Ayaz Amir, “While there is no comparison between the army and the Bugtis, taking on them would be no tea party. You can bet they will take to the hills, thus creating another South Waziristan for the army.” With the mullahs having identified Musharraf as a prime target as a Bush nominee, the sands of Balochistan will serve to bring the Pakistan Army to a hostile environment where tanks and APCs will be less useful than they are in Iraq. The latest threat is from the suicide bomber. Pakistani Army has been trained to fight the traditional war. The suicide bomber is not new for them, but has been used by them against others – the so-called infidels. Troops will find it difficult to understand the cross-labelling.

According to columnist Fakir S Ayazuddin, “There is the possibility that a situation could develop whereby all these fronts could open up and we would be on hunt and attack missions in all these areas. To see India bleed in Kashmir, the US in Afghanistan and now in Iraq makes for a spectacle on CNN. But if Pakistan were to find itself in such a situation, it would be a disaster. Pakistan does not have the staying power of the US or India, and so the thinkers in Islamabad must be reined in lest they lead us into yet another debacle. They would be well advised to read the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report, which points to the mindset that lost us half the country.”

The political developments in Balochistan indicate that Islamabad has not learnt any lessons from the past. To start with, the Baloch have a problem, not of their own making, but that has been thrust upon them – the economic deprivation and political alienation of its people. They have been robbed of their natural resources and without substantial industrial investment. The Baloch like other smaller ethnic groups perceive Punjabi hegemony as a single important factor in perpetuating internal colonialism. Islamabad is playing a dangerous game in exercising power, with a colonial mindset that believes in the use of brute force to brow beat the Baloch into submission. This tactic has not worked as the continuing violence in the province suggests. The emergence of Bangladesh due to the use of brute state power is case in point and Islamabad does not seem to have learnt any lesson from the past. In this context Mengal’s remark, “This is not the 70s” is prophetic. Today, the Pakistanis, whether Baloch or otherwise, is better armed than ever before. Along with hardcore economic issues, strong emotions exist based on ethno-cultural identity. If the issue is not dealt with prudently, it may not be long before an epitaph of the Pakistan nation is written in Balochi blood.

Prof. Partha Ghosh

Prof. Warikoo

Pakistan under Musharaf

Pakistan under Musharaf

Lecture by Prof. Kalim Bahadur
Conference Room no II, School of International Studies, JNU

Ever since Pakistan became independent 58 years ago, the country was under the direct military regime for more than half the time and the rest of the period it was under indirect military control. India as we know is and has been a flourishing democratic country with viable democratic set up. In contrast, Pakistan is struggling in itself to build its own secular stable democratic system.

It is important to note the development post II world war period, where in most of the newly independent countries could not build a viable democratic system of government. Be it in Africa, Latin America or in South Asia. It is also pertinent to ask as to why the military intervention in the political system is common in the third world countries? If we take the sum and substance of the various political systems in the third world countries, we come to a view that the military had intruded and dominated the political set up. Many scholars have written on ‘military intervention in politics’; notable among them are Samuel Huntington, Schlesinger and Hamsa Alvi. An intriguing question is why do some militaries dominate the state or continue to exercise considerable political influence while others have abstained from or terminated their political role?

The common theory is that where the democratic system is weak, the army is the only organized and cohesive structure that can modernize the society. There are others who argue that the problem of the legitimacy of the system, the control of the armed forces etc may also be responsible. In cases of tribal society, where there is a lack of democratic set up, military intervention is possible.

According to Hamsa Alvi, the third world countries do not fall in to the category of classical Marxist interpretation. The traditional Marxist conception is not right in many newly independent countries for the simple reason that they are above such classical interpretation.

It is imperative to note that in Muslim countries democracy is not or has not been successful. There are hardly three Muslim countries that are under democratic setup.

Type of Pakistani Society:

Pakistan is composed of provinces, such as Baluchistan, Sindh, NWFP and Punjab, which had tribal society than a middle class. Baluchistan is still a tribal society. So is NWFP. At that time, there was relatively strong middle class in East Pakistan. The influence of Pakistan Movement was not strong West Pakistan. In the 1946 election, Muslim League was not elected. In NWFP Congress government won.

When Pakistan came in to being, mostly the Indian migrant held the power Eg. Jinnah and Liaqut Ali Khan. It is only later the dominant Punjabi’s took the power in the Pakistan politics. There were general slogans on religious lines ‘ased on Islam’, ‘based on Quran’. No clear view on democracy and system of government was observed. This had possibly led to the rise of four military rulers in the history of Pakistan. In 1948, after the first of its four wars with India, Pakistan plunged into political instability, culminating in military rule dominated by Ayub Khan (1958), Yahya Khan (1969) , Zia-ul-Haq (1977), and more recently Musharraf (1999). This early militarization of Pakistani society shaped the Pakistani nation-state for the past 55 years.

For 50 years, the generals alternated with political leaders. Jinnah’s most prominent political successor, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated in 1951 and was eventually followed by the rule of Generals Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. Later, the populist Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, tried to impose an “Islamic socialist” regime that was neither religious nor leftist. The military hung him in 1979, leading to Zia ul-Haq’s 10-year interregnum, which ended in a still-mysterious 1988 plane crash. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif then alternated as prime minister in the 1980s and 1990s. Nawaz overreached himself, and the military deposed him in another of Pakistan’s bloodless coups. It must be remembered that the earlier 3 coups were a result of a political crisis where as the recent military coup was not under any political crisis. This coup violated all the basic principles of the Pakistani constitution. There was no reason for Nawaz Sharif to get deposed by a coup. However, unlike other coups, the constitution was not abrogated, but it was suspended for a brief period. Also Martial law was not declared. Another interesting feature of this coup is that it did not ban any political parties.

This political instability also manifested itself in Pakistan’s failed efforts to establish a functioning constitution or hold regular and consequential elections. In 55 years, Pakistan has had three constitutions—created in 1956, 1962, and 1973—and in 1985 Zia ul-Haq fundamentally altered the constitution with his introduction of the Eighth Amendment establishing a president-dominated executive. Then, in 1998 Nawaz Sharif repealed this amendment. Musharraf and his military colleagues (backed by legal advisors skilled in such endeavors) appear ready to undertake a fresh attempt to create a new constitutional order. National elections in recent years were held in 1985, 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997, but no elected Pakistani government has succeeded another in 55 years—all have been deposed by the military or dismissed by presidential fiat.

Dr. Kalim Bahadur then briefly outlined the parameters of his speech. He intended to examine the impact of Musharaf’s coup on the National Assembly, Political Parties and the Judiciary.

National Assembly:

On October 15, 1999, General Musharaf assumed the position of Chief Executive, declared a nation wide state of emergency and suspended the constitution, national assembly, the senate, the 4 provincial legislatures and all the political officials, except the President and the Judiciary.

In November 1999, Nawaz Sharif and six other senior officials (including Mohammed Shahbaz sharif, the brother of the ousted PM and the former Punjab CM) were arrested on the charges of criminal conspiracy and attemped murder in relation to the alleged refusal of landing rights to the commercial aircraft carrying Gen.Musharaf from Sri Lanka to Karachi on 12 October.

During early 2002 Musharaf reiterated his commitment to returning the country to democracy, beginning with the parliamentary elections scheduled for October. According to the 2002 Legal Framework Order and the 2003 17th Constitutional Amendment Act, the number of seats in the lower house of the Federal Legislature, called the National Assembly , was increased from 217 to 342. In this 60 seats were reserved for Women and 10 for non-muslims. Musharaf however insisted that a formal role for the military in governing the country was necessary to ensure a stable transition to democracy and to forestall a potential military coup.

Political Parties:

There are about 73 parties in Pakistan. However in the 2002 elections three alliances contested : the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (Chair: Makhdom Hashmi; includes the PML-N and PPPParliamentarians), the National Alliance ( Chair: Ghulam Jatoi; NPP, Sindh National Party, the National Awami Party) and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (Chair: Qazi Hussain; Jamait-e-Islami Pakistan, JeUePak, JeUeI(S), JeUeI(F) etc). Surprisingly MMA won by securing 45 seats, PML(Q) won 77 seats. On 21 November the PML (Q) candidate Zafarullah Khan Jamali was elected PM by the National Assembly. Meanwhile Musharaf agreed to transfer power to the elected government, but emphasized that he would continue to carry out his ‘important role’.

Recently he announced that he would renounce his uniform. In exchange the MMA agreed the amendments the Pakistan military wanted. Finally after the amendments, Musharaf denied to renounce his uniform.

Judiciary:

Pakistan has a poor Judiciary record. Let me provide two points to strengthen my point.

1. In March 1996, the Supreme Court in Karachi ruled that the government no longer had the exclusive mandate to appoint judges to the higher courts; these appointments would, in future be required to have the consent of the Chief Justices of High Courts and the Chief Justice of Pakistan. This ruling aroused considerable controversy since it deprived the executive of substantial authority within the national judicial system.

2. In late Jan 2000, Gen Musharaf was accused of undemocratic conduct and of attempting to erode the independence of the judiciary when he dismissed the country’s Chief Justice, Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, together with 5 other judges of the Supreme Court, following their refusal to swear allegiance to the military regime under a new boat. In May Gen. Musharaf’s regime was strengthened by a unanimous decision by the pro-military Supreme Court to validate the October 1999 coup as having been necessary to spare the country from chaos and bankruptcy.

Future of Pakistan

The future of Pakistan lies in the strength of the public support, President Musharaf is wielding. As a saying goes, ‘ It is easy to mount a tiger ,but it is difficult to dismount it’, so is the politics of Pakistan. Even Musharaf is in a state of complex crux from which he is trying to come out safely, but the reality is that, he could not.

Bangladesh: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow

Bangladesh: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow

Prof. Imtiaz Ahmed, Dhaka Universityommittee Room 1, School of International Studies, JNU

The speaker raised concerns over the inconsistencies of change and causation that led to the general perception of a small state syndrome about Bangladesh. Prof Imtiaz started his lecture by articulating a set of logical paradoxes regarding motion by a student of Parmenides called Zeno, which is referred as Zeno paradox. Zeno of Elea (490-430 BC) argued that if we see things in motion and our theory does not allow motion, then our senses must lie. Thus rather than seeing a solid object, an arrow, existing at definite points in its trajectory, the correct view is to see a wave of energy following the arrow's trajectory with much greater mass/energy presence at certain instances of space time. The speaker gave two examples of how Sunrise and Sunset appears to be factual but not real. He set the introductory observation on existence of contradictions and realities about Bangladesh, where in the reality is generally not understood.

• During yester years, Bangladesh resulted out of three phases – Geo political phase, Geo economic phase and Military regime phase.

• Geo political phase is characterized by Territorialization based on artificial boundaries, Bangladeshi Nationalism and Language movements. Due to the territorial bottle-up, the country is facing continuous disasters in the form of severe floods.

• Geo economic phase is characterized by the increase in non-state actors such as smugglers, traffickers, small arms traders etc who have increased in tempo and magnitude. This had given rise to sub-altern globalization.

• Military regime phase is characterized by the increase in nationalistic and religious fervor.

• Today, Bangladesh is characterized by – Small state syndrome, Power of non-governmental actors and Mastanocrazy.

• Though the country occupies 8th position in overall demography, it is termed to be ‘a small state’, because of its territorial extension.

• Non-Governmental actors play an important role in the development of Bangladesh. Eg. Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) is one of the largest NGO that takes care of developmental activities in the country. It is true that NGO’s has stepped up in the field of education, health and women empowerment.

• The politics in Bangladesh is characterized by Mastanocracy. The overwhelming power of money and muscle made its appearance with the advent of military rule in the country. Muscle power in politics these days, however, is essentially a problem in the developing countries.

• Tomorrow, Bangladesh will be characterized as a ‘soft state’. Soft state in terms of de-masculanised representation in politics, de- governmentalised representation in developmental activities and dealing with disasters. Not to rule out the fact that, Bangladesh is one of the few countries where in a powerful women leader reigns, where in the NGO’s work hand in hand with the government, where in the people learned to mitigate themselves in times of severe floods.

Discussions:

• Bengali people had to pay the highest price for religion during Pakistan period. This was one of the major reasons that secularity was adopted as one of the four state principles in our constitution. After the independence, issues of undertaking program to encourage people about secularity was raised before Banga Bandhu Sheikh Mujibar Rahman. Aftermath of the `75 coup d'état saw the rise of reactionary politics in Bangladesh. Military figures, sometimes in their uniform or in civil dress clutched power for nearly 15 years till 1990. They attempted to make themselves credible using religion. In this way Islam, the religion of the majority, started to be utilized in politics.

• The overwhelming power of money and muscle made its appearance with the advent of military rule in the country. Military or quasi-military rule is inevitably arbitrary and that is where the fault lies. Military governments invariably depended on the two-pronged strategy of coercion and bribery to secure legitimacy. Spreading money was extensively used for degenerating politics. "Money is no problem" became a catchy slogan in so poor a country. Corruption is endemic in Bangladesh and greed seems to be limitless. Public service in this social environment has become a victim of deal-making. In politics the power of money has assumed an unprecedented level of importance.

• The multiple identity has given rise to three forms of globalization – economic globalization, where in ‘production’ is globalized, Reverse globalization, where in culture is transmitted across boundaries, and sub altern globalization where in there exists a strong nexus between illegal traders through out the world.

• For Bangladesh, the terrorism let loose by organized thugs and goons widely reported to be assisted by the government agencies has long term implications for the country. Here the fear psychosis is being used, though rather crudely, with a long-term agenda in mind.It is assumed that a sizable number of Taliban cadres are present in Bangladesh. Most of them are reported to have taken arms training in Afghanistan.

• There are a total 225 identified Indian enclaves where in 119 are exchangeable and 11 are non –excahngeable. There are a total 95 Bangaldesh enclaves, where in 72 are exchangeable and 23 are non-exchangeable. This made nearly 200,000 people living in Indian enclaves along the Bangladeshi border stateless. Providing multiple citizenship might resolve the problem.