DISCUSSION ON BALOCHISTAN

13 September 2006, Wednesday

Committee Room, SIS, JNU

(Report of the Panel Discussion held at the Committee Room on 13 September 2006. The panel comprised of Prof. Kalim Bahadur, Dr. D Suba Chandran and Cdr. Alok Bansal. Prof. Mukherjee Chaired the session)

The discussion focused on the developments in Balochistan after the killing of Akbar Khan Bugti, the leader of Bugti tribe. Linkages to past insurgencies in the region, demands of the Baloch Sardars, interests of Baloch sub tribes, involvement of a foreign hand and the role of the Pakistani army in Bugti's killing were some of the significant factors examined. Another crucial issue debated was whether Bugti's death has any space for external intervention in Balochistan.

Dr. Suba Chandran
Assistant Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

Bugti's killing has not yet become a political disaster. It was a military initiative with no involvement of the political elite. Musharraf has won the 'battle' but the 'war' against Baloch nationalism is far from over. Also, without external support, Baloch nationalist movement will not succeed.

Firstly, circumstances prevailing prior to Bugti's killing need to be closely examined. The sub tribes of the Bugtis namely Kalpars and Masuris have been traditional opponents of Akbar Bugti. The military regime purposely pushed the Kalpars back to Dera Bugti and Sui areas, while Musharraf tried to side with the Kalpars on their claim over Sui and the royalty accruing from it in order to weaken Akbar Bugti's position.

Moreover, there were series of surrenders by Marri and Bugti tribesmen and Musharraf ensured that no political vacuum prevailed before the killing of Bugti. Two days before the killing, a tribal jirga comprising of most of the sub tribes was held that decided to confiscate Bugti's property. The jirga agreed on the prevalence of Pakistani Law and abolition of the Sardari system.

Sui is highly important to Pakistan due to its rich gas reserves, royalty and supplies. Therefore, killing of Bugti aimed at teaching him a lesson for trying to gain more benefits from the area.

Secondly, the future of the Baloch nationalist movement is unclear. Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, and Nawab Khair Bux Marri had their own differences that resulted in numerous egoistic clashes. With the killing of Bugti, the question is who will represent him? There is an intra family clash among the Bugtis over the new Sardar's position. The alliance of the heads of three tribes against the centre is in trouble. However, another view is that by killing Bugti, Musharraf has made him a national 'hero.'

Thirdly, the Balochistan Liberation Army or BLA does not have the capability to fight a long waged war against the army or carry out guerilla warfare. It remains a Marri militia and the involvement of Bugtis and Mengals is limited. The role of the middle class and the Baloch Diaspora in the BLA has to be analyzed in greater depth. It is doubtful if the BLA will become a potent force to reckon with, given its inherent weakness and strength of Pakistan's 'lethal' armed forces.

So far, it is a military initiative and not a 'national disaster' and the opposition has not been able to mobilize or push for the no-confidence motion. Even the PML-Q has not split. The MMA will decide whether it wants to continue its membership in the Baloch Legislative Assembly. Thus, Bugti's killing has not become a rallying point for the political parties. Only some border districts of Sindh and Karachi have witnessed violence and protests while other districts are peaceful. The killing of Bugti is more a mistake than a disaster.

Many believe that US has vested interests in the region because of the Chinese presence and interest in Gwadar. It is important to bear in mind that neither the Baloch nationalist movement nor the Baloch armed movement will succeed until they get proactive external support.

Cdr.Alok Bansal
Research Fellow, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses

Sporadic cases of violence continue across the entire length and breadth of Balochistan. The Gwadar port, Mirani dam, and government buildings have been targeted besides communication links and gas pipelines that have been hit by the insurgents with alarming regularity. Security forces have raided some Baloch living in Karachi and Quetta and claimed to have recovered a large cache of arms from Marri camp in Quetta. Political attempts to negotiate have come to a nought, though the parliamentary committee on Balochistan has recommended a hefty economic package for the province but the nationalists are firm on their two demands namely, halting the construction of three new cantonments in Balochistan and handing over the Gwadar port and its development to the provincial government.

It would be misleading to consider the incidents at Dera Bugti and Sui as distinct from other events in Balochistan. The fighting against the security forces around Sui and Dera Bugti has been largely carried out by Bugti tribesmen, as is borne out by the control that was exercised by Nawab Bugti on the tribesmen. But the BLA’s involvement has also been clearly evident. In fact, an organization called Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) claimed responsibility for the firings on the Sui gas plant. Nawab Bugti has claimed that BLA, BLF and BPLF are different organisations, but they appear to be one and the same organisation or at best three closely allied organisations. Their men are suspected to be manning the positions on the hills surrounding the region. It is likely that the firing of Russian made rockets and mortars has been coordinated by these three groups. Nawab

Bugti as well as Nawab Khair Bux Marri and Sardar Ataullah Mengal have not hidden their sympathies and support for the BLA. Their articulations of Baloch demands and negotiations indicate that they have influence with the BLA, but they may not control this organisation. “This is why anti-Islamabad Baloch leaders are not prepared to take responsibility for the actions of BLA even as they secretly urge it to wage war against the external ‘occupying’ power.”

If the violence in Balochistan intensifies, the Pakistani army will definitely be sucked into a war that will fester and bleed Pakistan. According to a well-known Pakistani journalist Ayaz Amir, “While there is no comparison between the army and the Bugtis, taking on them would be no tea party. You can bet they will take to the hills, thus creating another South Waziristan for the army.” With the mullahs having identified Musharraf as a prime target as a Bush nominee, the sands of Balochistan will serve to bring the Pakistan Army to a hostile environment where tanks and APCs will be less useful than they are in Iraq. The latest threat is from the suicide bomber. Pakistani Army has been trained to fight the traditional war. The suicide bomber is not new for them, but has been used by them against others – the so-called infidels. Troops will find it difficult to understand the cross-labelling.

According to columnist Fakir S Ayazuddin, “There is the possibility that a situation could develop whereby all these fronts could open up and we would be on hunt and attack missions in all these areas. To see India bleed in Kashmir, the US in Afghanistan and now in Iraq makes for a spectacle on CNN. But if Pakistan were to find itself in such a situation, it would be a disaster. Pakistan does not have the staying power of the US or India, and so the thinkers in Islamabad must be reined in lest they lead us into yet another debacle. They would be well advised to read the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report, which points to the mindset that lost us half the country.”

The political developments in Balochistan indicate that Islamabad has not learnt any lessons from the past. To start with, the Baloch have a problem, not of their own making, but that has been thrust upon them – the economic deprivation and political alienation of its people. They have been robbed of their natural resources and without substantial industrial investment. The Baloch like other smaller ethnic groups perceive Punjabi hegemony as a single important factor in perpetuating internal colonialism. Islamabad is playing a dangerous game in exercising power, with a colonial mindset that believes in the use of brute force to brow beat the Baloch into submission. This tactic has not worked as the continuing violence in the province suggests. The emergence of Bangladesh due to the use of brute state power is case in point and Islamabad does not seem to have learnt any lesson from the past. In this context Mengal’s remark, “This is not the 70s” is prophetic. Today, the Pakistanis, whether Baloch or otherwise, is better armed than ever before. Along with hardcore economic issues, strong emotions exist based on ethno-cultural identity. If the issue is not dealt with prudently, it may not be long before an epitaph of the Pakistan nation is written in Balochi blood.

Prof. Partha Ghosh

Prof. Warikoo